

Knightsbridge Partnership

BASELINE AUDIT - Security

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Executive Summary.

This security audit for The Brompton Road BID area was completed by combining visual environmental assessments at different times of the day along with diagnostic interviews with BID members across the following areas:

1. Retail.
2. Food and Beverage (F&B).
3. Offices.
4. Hotels
5. Landowners / management companies.

This was complimented by interviews with neighbourhood police.

In terms of crime and ASB the audit assessed the known issues through assessment of official reported crime along with the views of those interviewed and the observations.

By taking academic views on board the audit sort to identify how the BID can best strategically support the long-term and immediate reduction of crime and ASB along with improving the perception of safety.

The key areas that the audit interviews with businesses assessed were:

1. Internal security provisions.
2. CCTV and radio communications.
3. Intelligence flow.
4. Security/crime concerns and reporting to police/local authority.
5. Steps taken in preparedness for a critical Incident / terrorist attack.
6. Possession of 1st aid kits, trauma packs and defibrillators.

Whilst the area has some effective and good practice it is largely fragmented when considering the BID area as an integrated community. Far stronger cohesion tended to be based on the nature and size of the business.

The low presence of CCTV in the public realm, no effective live communication across the entire BID area and low levels of security presence are a concern.

The culmination is a set of 23 recommendations for the BID board to consider based of the observations, interviews and known facts. Each recommendation has a suggested timeframe and where possible any future cost.

Introduction.

The Brompton Road BID spans Knightsbridge and Brompton Road.

The BID area is contained within parts of Westminster City Council (Knightsbridge and Belgravia Policing Neighbourhood) and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (Brompton and Hans Town Policing Neighbourhood).

The area is one of two defined International shopping districts within the London Plan with a reputation for being an area to purchase luxury goods.

The other defined area is London's West End which has long been supported by a BID with several other BID's operating across the broader West End.

The established BID areas have supported and raised the attractiveness of their areas with a clear focus on reducing crime and anti-social behaviour (ASB) along with the critical factor of making visitors and workers feel safe through the deployment of uniformed security patrols along with clean, well maintained public realm.

The latter is important to reducing crime and ASB and forms a key consideration when taking account of Broken Windows Theory¹ which explores how to reduce low-level, high-volume crime and disorder. This report explores how the Brompton Road BID can deliver the same benefits to this internationally

¹ *Wilson and Kelling 1982*

renowned area against the backdrop of losing pace with the West End, the global emergence from the ongoing impact of COVID and the threat from International terrorism including the comments and recommendations to date from The Manchester Arena Inquiry Chair - The Honourable Sir John Saunders.

Methodology.

The audit has been split into two distinct assessments.

Firstly, several visual environmental audits that have taken place during the early morning, lunchtime, evening, and night-time.

Secondly, carrying out diagnostic interviews with an array of members covering the following types of business.

1. Retail.
2. Food and Beverage (F&B).
3. Offices.
4. Hotels
5. Landowners / management companies.

The combined observations, comments of members and consultation with statutory authorities concludes with commentary on matters relating to the prevention and reduction of crime along with recommendations for the BID Board to consider. Some recommendations require multi-lateral agreements whilst others are unilateral.

The complexity and potential cost of each work stream have been the determining factors as to whether the recommendation is a short, medium, or long-term objective.

Reported Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour.

The BID footprint is contained within the policing neighbourhoods of '*Knightsbridge and Belgravia*' and '*Brompton and Hans Town*'.


The following graphs are taken from national police data for '*Knightsbridge and Belgravia*' and are the latest published figures as of 1st December 2021.

The below graph sets out the quarterly track of reported crime and ASB (this is only that reported to police and not Westminster Council).


The track is typical of Central London with a slow increase up until COVID restrictions being introduced, followed by an increase as restrictions were eased. There is a further fall during the second lockdown with a continued steady rise thereafter until today.



The graph below sets out the types of crime reported over the 3-year period.



The following graphs provide the same data sets for 'Brompton and Hans Town' over the same 3-year period.



Although the tracking for both policing neighbourhoods are very similar that for 'Brompton and Hans Town' is far more pronounced.

By examining the associated crime mapping for each policing neighbourhood so as to focus on the subset of the section of the BID area within the neighbourhood the following crimes are of concern.

Knightsbridge and Belgravia.

- Vehicle crime.
- Violence and sexual offences.
- Theft person.

Hans Town and Brompton.

- Shoplifting.
- Theft person.
- Theft other.
- Robbery.

By way of explanation:

- Vehicle crime includes theft from, theft of and criminal damage to vehicles.
- Theft person includes theft by snatch and pickpocketing.
- Theft other is a very wide group of offences but for interpretation of this report includes distraction thefts and theft of unattended items.
- Violence and sexual offences include all violent and sexual offences including domestic violence.
- Robbery is any theft where force is used or threatened in order to steal.
- Shoplifting is any theft of merchandise on public display from a retailer other than that by an employee.

With the exception of robbery those offences listed are of concern due to the volume.

Robbery is included as such offences in the area tend to be offenders targeting victims with high value watches. The volume is not high, but the constant nature of property targeted, and levels of extreme violence used are of significant concern.

Hotspots for theft person tend to be close to transport termini, F&B businesses and near to the exits of retailers along with quiet roads close to the BID area.

Public Realm Audit.

The visual environmental audits were carried out at various times of the day and on different days of the week. The audits looked at the BID area and the streets immediately adjacent to it.

The principal roads of Knightsbridge and Brompton Road are main thoroughfares that converge at Scotch Corner. Both are punctuated with various pedestrian crossings. Traffic is generally heavy with notable congestion at Scotch Corner for large parts of the day. However, there are times where the congestion is limited allowing a vehicle to potentially move at high speeds. There are barriers

outside Harrods on Brompton Road and some raised footways on the North of Brompton Road. In considering a potential Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device attack (as recently seen at Liverpool's Women's Hospital) or a crash followed by a marauding knife attack there appears to be insufficient hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) in the area.

I could not ascertain if barriers outside Harrods were HVM rated. Narrow pavements in other areas present potential challenges for HVM installation including areas of high footfall at the underground station exits at Hyde Park Corner and for Knightsbridge those beside and opposite Harvey Nichols.

These areas are obvious risks and should be reviewed by the two local authorities in light of impending 'Duty to Protect' legislation.

Recommendation 1. The potential installation of HVM and traffic calming is taken forward as a stand-alone project with the assistance of a Counter Terrorism Security Adviser and both local authorities (CTSA) and both local authorities.

A common issue at Hyde Park Corner Station and Knightsbridge Station (Exits by Harvey Nicholls and besides The Mandarin Oriental Hotel) were the volume of people apparently disorientated and using mobile phones to seek directions. Most were completely oblivious of their surroundings with several suspicious males (groups and alone) seen on occasions loitering and paying unhealthy attention to those described, most of whom were female. Whilst it is known that Westminster has no monitored CCTV systems in the area the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea do. During this assessment the exact locations of the CCTV could not be ascertained. In addition, there are some Transport for London cameras in the area.

Recommendation 2. Complete a public realm CCTV audit and make recommendations for monitored public realm CCTV in the area.

In the hours of darkness, the exit from Hyde Park Corner Station and pavement towards Brompton Road is poorly lit and has a sense of being unsafe compounded by scaffolding as building works progress. The crime mapping indicates regular, albeit low volume, theft person and violence/sexual offences in this area.

The broader BID area is dimly lit in contrast to nearby Kensington High Street which is brightly lit providing a better sense of security.

Recommendation 3. Carry out a lighting survey.

The area around Knightsbridge Green seemed to be a meeting place to eat lunch and for some to drink alcohol. The nearby BT phone boxes were daily littered with escort cards. In the evening the area is littered with rubbish and a number of people were observed loitering potentially involved in drug dealing.



The nearby alleyway connecting Brompton Road via Raphael Street with Knightsbridge is poorly lit and has a negative ambience at night giving a feeling of

being unsafe. This is compounded by people dwelling at the Knightsbridge end of the alleyway.

A further alleyway connects Knightsbridge with South Carriage Drive, Hyde Park. There is a crossing offset between the two alleyways.

Recommendation 4. Look at a redesign of Knightsbridge Green and the alleyways referred to including relocating the crossing between the two alleyways to provide a continuous path between Hyde Park, Knightsbridge and Brompton Road creating an attractive thoroughfare in line with similar schemes in Covent Garden and Motcomb Street. This will assist design out crime and ASB along with making a positive feature of the two alleyways and Knightsbridge Green promoting a safe and positive image.

It was noted that vacant properties managed by large organisations were well dressed and despite being empty did not detract from the area. However, other vacant properties looked as though they had been abandoned and created a sense of an area in decay. It was noticeable that street begging and a rough sleeper were regularly present in these areas in line with what would be expected when considering Broken Windows Theory.

A large number of those begging appeared to be from organised groups evident by them having the same cards with pleas for money on and that some were clearly working in concert with each other.



Recommendation 5. Work with all landowners to establish an agreed minimum standard for the dressing of vacant properties.

It was observed that several bicycles were chained to street furniture with others secured to street-based anchor points designed for the purpose. The first group are more likely to be stolen or damaged with several observed laying against the pavement having been knocked over. Some of the bikes on stands appeared to have been damaged and left. In both cases they look unsightly and give the impression that crime has happened at the location undermining the sense of safety.

Recommendation 6. Work with building owners to establish at least one 'Bike Drop' type facility to take bicycles off street and into a safer environment. This facility has been introduced in nearby BID areas as seen below.



There was notable build-up of rubbish bags throughout the day with many bags left uncollected beyond 24-hours. There were multiple bags indicating various collection agents. However, those left for long periods detract from the sense of wellbeing along with attracting anti-social behaviour. Several bags appeared to have been kicked open or split. A homeless male was seen collecting cardboard probably to be used to create a barrier from the pavement where he sleeps. This in itself could be the reason he is attracted to the area.



Recommendation 7. Establish contact details for all refuse collection agents along with agreeing an escalation process for uncollected rubbish.

Recommendation 8. Commence a waste education program with businesses where the non-collection of rubbish is a repeat issue and/or driver for ASB.

During the audits no police or local authority warden foot patrols were observed. It is accepted that both police and local authority (Only RBKC have wardens) have limited assets in respect of both and in respect of the police dedicated ward officers they have a far larger footprint than the BID area to cover.

Recommendation 9. Negotiate with the MPS and RBKC for a diarised program of joint patrols with the BID street wardens and a co-ordinated deployment of assets.

Business Audit.

The audit interviews with members looked at the following key areas:

- Internal security provisions.
- CCTV and radio communications.
- Intelligence flow.
- Security/crime concerns and reporting to police/local authority.
- Steps taken in preparedness for a critical Incident / terrorist attack.
- Possession of 1st aid kits, trauma packs and defibrillators.

Internal security provisions.

Retail.

Large department stores and high-end international boutiques all had in-store security presence. These venues had clear instructions for security staff. In a similar vein the large department stores and high-end boutiques provide an overarching security input to all staff. However, for most this does not include any input of localised crime and ASB issues.

For SME and smaller boutiques, the presence of licensed security is a mixed picture. In these locations it was evident that general staff did not have any meaningful security briefing as part of induction and were also unaware of the crime and ASB profile for the area.

F&B.

None of the F&B venues interviewed had any security as a matter of course.

A large franchise had security embedded in its induction, but this was unique amongst the cohort spoken to.

Offices.

Most offices had reasonable to good levels of controlled access and CCTV along with concierge/security.

Staff operating in these functions were briefed about internal security protocols and processes. However, general staff were not briefed. Neither group having any input on local crime and ASB issues

Hotels.

All but one hotel had significant in-house security teams who were fully aware of local crime issues although less sighted on ASB challenges.

Most staff had a security input as part of their induction to the site.

General staff were far less sighted on local crime and ASB matters.

Landowners / Management.

Local landowners and their facilities management teams were supported by in-house security teams who were sighted on local crime and ASB.

Similar to the hotels most staff receive a security briefing during induction relating to the operation of the business. There is generally no input on local crime and ASB.

None were yet linked into the BID security wardens. This was rectified immediately.

Recommendation 10. The BID wardens collate opening and closing times of the smaller businesses and ensure that where possible the patrol strategy takes this into account.

Recommendation 11. Formal introductions are arranged for the BID wardens to meet the Landowners/management in-house security teams.

CCTV and radio communications.

Retail.

All locations visited had in store CCTV systems ranging from state-of-the-art to older systems.

The large department stores and high-end international boutiques all had GDPR policies and a process to download and hand over recordings to police.

None of the smaller venues had such processes in place although boutiques did.

Large retailers and international boutiques had internal communication systems. Of note was that where venues had the same security vendor (Inter and CIS) they were in communication with colleagues in different stores. This bleeds into Sloane Street where the vendors provide for other boutiques.

Smaller venues and boutiques (unless using Inter or CIS) did not have radio systems but many were on a WhatsApp group where live events were shared. Whilst WhatsApp is effective and efficient it is not GDPR compliant.

F&B.

None of the F&B locations had any radio link internally or externally.

Most had CCTV with some managed by a company centralised office. It was not possible to ascertain if they had GDPR policies but given the centralised nature of some this is highly likely.

Where downloading had a localised capacity staff were not aware of GDPR requirements.

Offices.

Offices generally had good CCTV particularly in support of controlled access.

All had GDPR policies generally managed by the landowners or facilities management companies.

None used internal or external radio systems.

Hotels.

All hotels had extensive CCTV systems with internal and some external coverage.

All had GDPR policies.

All had internal radio communication systems but no external equivalent.

Landowners / Management.

This group had sizable internal CCTV coverage but limited collateral views onto the public realm.

All had GDPR policies.

All had internal radio systems for facilities management. However, the radio systems did not link in with tenants.

Strategic position.

The area has some public realm CCTV owned by TfL and some owned by RBKC. The latter is monitored by a 24/7 control room.

WCC have no public realm CCTV in the area. This has been the position for some time. This matter has not been progressed due to differing positions taken by WCC and the MPS.

Recommendation 12. Dialogue is started to look at if, and how, the BID can persuade RBKC and WCC to extend the existing 24/7 CCTV presence and monitoring into the WCC footprint of the BID with capital injection for new cameras to be installed.

Recommendation 13. A CCTV audit of businesses is completed to ascertain areas covered, SPOC's for each business and identify blind spots. This should be made available to police and local authorities in the event of a critical incident or terrorist attack.

Recommendation 14. Consider joining Safer Business Network with a view to the provision of a town link radio system for members.

Intelligence flow.

Retail.

The process of sharing intelligence ranged from non-existent, to internal only, and then across a diverse number of networks none of which were co-terminus with the BID boundary. This broadly mirrors the framework for 'communication'. The network of luxury watch retailers and jewellers were connected via a WhatsApp group that extended into West End boutiques. As stated previously WhatsApp is not GDPR compliant albeit the system is simple and effective at sharing relevant intelligence.

F&B.

Intelligence flow within this sector was minimal with one venue having a WhatsApp Group across their London chain.

Offices.

There was no evidence of intelligence flow across this sector.

Hotels.

All hotels were linked to a WhatsApp group known as 'West One'. This covered 5-star hotels across the footprint along with those in the West End.

The Institute of Hotel Security Managers (IHSM) has a network of hotels nationally with the ability to share intelligence through a GDPR compliant platform registered with the ICO. This is linked to an ISA with the Metropolitan Police.

Landowners / Management.

Intelligence sharing amongst those interviewed was primarily internal with members of senior management receiving broad updates on crime in Central London through partnership meetings.

Recommendation 15. The BID join Safer Business Network to use their intelligence platform (DISC) which is GDPR compliant and subject to an ISA with the MPS along with the Sentry SIS function that allows the fast time sharing of intelligence through a GDPR compliant platform.

Security/crime concerns and reporting to police/local authority.

Retail.

Common concerns were shoplifting, the theft of bags and phones and a significant concern over watch robberies very close to the BID area.

Several retailers were worried about the level of begging and its apparent organised nature.

Some staff who worked alone or in small teams also raised concerns about locking up at night expressing a feeling of being vulnerable. Many of these staff are female with some referencing the murder of Sarah Everard.

The presence of large numbers of travellers at the weekend was mentioned as a continual challenge linking the groups anti-social and often disruptive behaviour within retail premises.

Many retailers did not report all crimes within their venues including shoplifting and credit card fraud which tend to be volume crime types. The common narrative was they did not want to take up valuable police resource and that 101 was rarely answered in a timely manner.

The bi-product of this is that police intelligence becomes inaccurate and potentially impacts on the deployment of police assets allowing such problems to continue with little chance of any consequence.

Without being able to quantify the level of under-reporting in this audit it is likely that the level is significant. This presents a further problem as crime levels are a component for the allocation of policing resources nationally and locally.

There was limited knowledge within this sector about what constituted ASB and to whom it should be reported.

F&B.

This sector raised concerns regarding table surfing, bag thefts along with female members of staff being harassed.

One venue was particularly concerned about opening up alone around 6.30am and similarly when locking up at the end of the day.

Several raised concerns about young members of the traveller community being rude, aggressive, and disruptive to their business over most weekends.

The presence of organised beggars taking up positions outside the venues with no apparent organisation to move them on was raised. However, they stated they had already seen a positive difference with the introduction of the BID street wardens.

Crimes are rarely reported unless it is a member of staff or company property involved. Where the victim is a customer the decision to report is largely left with the victim.

There was limited knowledge within this sector about what constituted ASB and to whom it should be reported.

Offices.

There was limited concern from this sector with walk in thefts and theft related offences in the public realm linked to retail and F&B mentioned.

Hotels.

Hotels had few concerns for their venues beyond infrequent thefts.

However, their major concern was the crime within the public realm including theft from the cars of their clients with Wilton Place and Trevor Square being named as repeat venues. This correlates with crime mapping.

Another issue raised was the targeting of their guests for expensive watches and mobile phones. This is a mixture of robbery and snatch type offences with some involving worrying levels of violence.

One explained that a group had attempted to rob two guests of watches on Pavilion Road. The guests had escaped with their watches and were understandably shaken. When spoken to by the

Hotel they decided not to report the attack. A few days later a male was robbed of his watch at the same location. During this attack the victim was electrocuted with a stun gun. This is a clear illustration of where a report may have altered a patrol strategy and prevented a similar crime or led to the identification of those involved.

Whilst this sector appreciated what constituted ASB it was rarely reported.

Landowners / Management.

A number of concerns were raised with public realm-based theft offences including shoplifting, pedicabs, begging, buskers and groups of travellers being aggressive to their tenants at weekends cited.

The presence of groups of males in the evening was a concern with Raphael Street and Hans Crescent key areas of concern.

Where a tenant was the victim of an offence or subjected to any ASB it was left to the tenant to report. The opinion was that many matters were not reported.

Recommendation 16. Start a program of short workshops supporting businesses understand why and how to report crime and ASB to police and the relevant local authority. (Many were unaware of how to report on-line.)

Recommendation 17. Provide safety workshops for staff in the area including Welfare and Vulnerability Engagement training (WAVE) via Safer Business Network . This should initially be focused on the businesses who expressed a concern for personal safety during the audit and, those operating under a premises licence.

Steps taken in preparedness for a critical incident/terrorist attack.

Retail.

When looking at the 'Prepare' and 'Prevent' aspects of the governments counter terrorism strategy - 'Contest' there was a limited awareness of free online training (ACT/Scan). This is now a requirement for SIA licensed operatives with those holding existing licences needing to complete an on-line module along with a first aid at work qualification at renewal of their licence (every 3-years). Some businesses were unaware of this requirement and rely solely on their security providers to maintain the required qualifications.

There was a view the ACT/Scan was for security licensed staff only

The understanding of the likely impact of Martyn's Law arising from The Manchester Arena Inquiry was limited with few retailers starting to assess what, if any, changes they may need to introduce. With Chapter 1 of the inquiry published there are some clear indications of the areas where legislative changes are likely to happen.

All retailers had documented evacuation plans but few had 'lock in' plans.

F&B.

One of the F&B businesses interviewed insist all managers complete the on-line ACT/Scan training. None of the others were aware of the training.

At a corporate level one of the businesses was actively looking at the impact of 'Duty to Protect' legislation but this was a unique position within the cohort interviewed in this sector.

All had evacuation plans that were documented and formed part of onboarding induction. However, concern was raised over the volume of staff turnover and trying to maintain this moving forward.

None of the businesses interviewed had a lock in plan.

Offices.

Outside of those with a security licence there was a lack of knowledge around ACT/Scan and how it could be accessed.

All had evacuation plans but none had a lock in plan.

Neither tenants nor facility management companies had considered the future impact of 'Duty to Protect'.

Hotels.

The hotel sector was very engaged with ACT/Scan training with all security staff required to complete this often supported by inputs from outside speakers. Additionally, several required duty managers to complete the training.

All had both evacuation and lock in procedures.

All were either looking at how 'Duty to Protect' may impact on the operation of their businesses or had this in their sight as a key issue moving forward.

Landowners / Management.

In this group ACT/Scan was limited to those working in security and those in management roles. However, one of those interviewed was about to launch the provision of an external training input for all staff. They were not aware that ACT/Scan could be accessed via <https://ct.highfieldlearning.com/>

All had evacuation plans but none had a lock in procedure.

All had sort external advice on the potential impact of 'Duty to Protect' and were constantly evaluating their operations in light of this aspect.

Recommendation 18. Approach West End Security Group with a view to joining to access support around supporting the BID and its members prepare for critical incidents and acts of terrorism.

Recommendation 19. Arrange and facilitate annual tabletop exercises with members to test readiness for a critical incident / terrorist attack.

Recommendation 20. Arrange and facilitate 'Servator' training sessions with the MPS for BID based security teams. - Servator provides a form of behavioural assessments and how to engage with those deemed to be a potential risk.

Recommendation 21. Promote the on-line and free ACT/Scan training to all businesses.

Possessions of first aid kits, trauma packs and defibrillators.

Retail

All had 1st aid kits, but none had trauma packs. Only the department stores interviewed in the audit had defibrillators.

F&B.

All had 1st aid kits, but none had trauma packs or defibrillators.

Offices.

All had 1st aid kits, but none had trauma packs or defibrillators.

Hotels.

All had 1st aid kits and defibrillators, but none had trauma packs.

Landowners / Management.

All had 1st aid kits and defibrillators with one having trauma packs that had been accompanied by the relevant training.

Recommendation 22. To purchase and locate a number of trauma packs over the BID area (these should be businesses with a 24/7 operation) along with the associated training.

Recommendation 23. Persuade businesses with defibrillators to register them with 'GoodSAM' - <https://www.goodsamapp.org/> so that they can be located in an emergency and get staff to download

the 'GoodSAM alerter' application. This provides instant advice, location, and link to the emergency services along with detailing where the nearest registered defibrillator is.

Conclusions.


Crime and ASB was a clear major concern for nearly all of those interviewed with key locations broadly mirrored by the visual audit.

Several female staff working in retail raised concerns about their personal safety with both opening and closing times a prime worry for them.

There is a clear level of under reporting for both crime and ASB. The concern must be the impact on the accuracy of intelligence across the partnership leading to the incorrect deployment of assets and tactics along with poor maintenance and control of the public realm.

The perception that the presence of police and RBKC wardens was, at best, limited may be part of the reason why certain crimes and incidents of ASB are not being reported along with a 101-system deemed not fit for purpose.

The picture of communication within private security across the area is fragmented and constructed around the nature of the business and who provides the licensed security staff. This is replicated in the general flow of intelligence. The following structure of GDPR non-compliant WhatsApp groups currently operate.



The area has a substantial number of CCTV systems in operation but that in the public realm is limited. In the case of the WCC section, public realm CCTV appears to be non-existent. Given the area is one of two London International Districts this is a significant concern exacerbated when overlaid with the initial comments of Sir John Saunders – Chair of The Manchester Arena Inquiry.

In terms of preparedness for critical incident or terrorist attack businesses were in wide range of positions.

Hotels, landowners, department stores and some luxury boutiques were well versed with appropriate training in place although very few had a 'lock in' protocol.

Other businesses are virtually unsighted with little or no knowledge of Government advice to businesses, ACT/Scan training or the potential impact of legislative changes on the horizon.

Whilst there is a reasonable distribution of defibrillators across the area many are unsighted on their location including staff within the businesses that have purchased them. It appears to be unlikely that any are registered on any national scheme. Whilst all businesses had 1st aid kits trauma packs and the associated required training were rare.

The area has the basis on being able to evolve a strong partnership security framework but will require greater integration across the different types with the following recommended as the key strategic strands for delivery of a stronger security eco-system where security is accepted as a key tenant for all staff and businesses in the BID area and not just law enforcement and private security.

- Communication.
- Intelligence.
- CCTV.
- Long-term problem solving.
- Preparedness for a major incident / terrorist attack.

The recommendations listed below are put forward as the initial considerations towards evolving the BID area security to prevent and reduce both crime and ASB.

Recommendation Grid.

Number	Narrative	Timeframe	Cost	Board Assessment
1	The potential installation of HVM / traffic calming is taken forward as a stand-alone project with the assistance of a Counter Terrorism Security Adviser and both local authorities and both local authorities.	2-5 years	To be advised	
2	Complete a public realm CCTV audit and make recommendations for monitored public realm CCTV in the area.	Within 6-months	£6,000	
3	Carry out a lighting survey.	Within 6- months	To be advised	
4	Scope a redesign of Knightsbridge Green and the Associated alleyways leading to South Carriage Drive	Within 18-months	Dan Johnson to be consulted	
5	Work with all landowners to establish an agreed minimum standard for the dressing of vacant properties.	Within 12-months	No cost	
6	Work with building owners to establish at least one Bike Drop type facility	Within 12-months	No cost	
6	Work with building owners to establish at least one Bike Drop type facility	Within 12-months	No cost	
7	Establish contact details for all refuse collection agents along with agreeing an escalation process for uncollected rubbish.	Immediate	To be advised	
8	Commence a waste education program with businesses where the non-collection of rubbish is a repeat issue and/or driver for ASB.	Immediate	To be advised	
9	Negotiate with MPS for diarised joint patrols with BID wardens.	Immediate	No cost	
10	Align warden patrol strategy to opening/closing times of small retailers	Immediate	No Cost	
11	BID Wardens to have formal meet and greet with building owner internal security teams.	Immediate	No Cost	
12	Commence dialogue with RBKC and WCC to share public realm CCTV monitoring. (This will be linked to part of recommendation 2.)	Within 6-months	Within Recommendation 2	
13	Complete a CCTV audit of businesses and create a master list of coverage, protocols, and SPOC's at each business	Within 12-months	£6,000	
14	Join SBN re 'town link' radio system	Within 12-months	Awaits cost	
15	Join SBN re DISC intelligence platform and SentrySIS -live share facility			
16	Program of 12 workshops of how to report crime/ASB	Within 12-months	£5,400	
17	Program of personal safety workshops and WAVE training	Within 12-months	£5,400	
18	Consider joining West End Security Group re CT preparation	Within 6-months	Awaits cost	
19	Create and facilitate annual tabletop exercises re terrorist attack	Within 12-months	£7,200	
20	Arrange a facilitate 'Servator' training for local security with MPS	Within 12-months	£1,800	
21	Promote ACT/Scan training to all BID members	Immediate	No Cost	
22	Purchase and deploy trauma packs (along with training)	Within 12-months	Awaits cost	
23	Persuade businesses to register defibrillators with GoodSAM	Immediate	No Cost	

